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Background: The last decade has seen widespread retreat from user fees with the intention to reduce financial
constraints to users in accessing health care and in particular improving access to reproductive, maternal and
newborn health services. This has had important benefits in reducing financial barriers to access in a number of
settings. If the policies work as intended, service utilization rates increase. However this increases workloads for
health staff and at the same time, the loss of user fee revenues can imply that health workers lose bonuses or
allowances, or that it becomes more difficult to ensure uninterrupted supplies of health care inputs.
This research aimed to assess how policies reducing demand-side barriers to access to health care have affected
service delivery with a particular focus on human resources for health.
Methods: We undertook case studies in five countries (Ghana, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Zimbabwe). In each
we reviewed financing and HRH policies, considered the impact financing policy change had made on health
service utilization rates, analysed the distribution of health staff and their actual and potential workloads, and
compared remuneration terms in the public sectors.
Results: We question a number of common assumptions about the financing and human resource inter-relationships.
The impact of fee removal on utilization levels is mostly not sustained or supported by all the evidence. Shortages of
human resources for health at the national level are not universal; maldistribution within countries is the greater
problem. Low salaries are not universal; most of the countries pay health workers well by national benchmarks.
Conclusions: The interconnectedness between user fee policy and HRH situations proves difficult to assess. Many
policies have been changing over the relevant period, some clearly and others possibly in response to problems
identified associated with financing policy change. Other relevant variables have also changed.
However, as is now well-recognised in the user fee literature, co-ordination of health financing and human resource
policies is essential. This appears less well recognised in the human resources literature. This coordination involves
considering user charges, resource availability at health facility level, health worker pay, terms and conditions, and
recruitment in tandem. All these policies need to be effectively monitored in their processes as well as outcomes, but
sufficient data are not collected for this purpose.
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Universal health coverage (UHC) has been labelled, ‘the
most powerful unifying single concept that public health
has to offer’, by Margaret Chan, Director of the World
Health Organization [1].
UHC has become an international policy. In 2007, uni-
versal access to reproductive health was included among
the Millennium Development Goals (MDG, goal 5b), which
were unanimously agreed by all UN member states as part
of the Millennium Declaration [2]. A UN resolution was
passed by the UN General Assembly in December 2012,
urging governments to ensure whole population access to
affordable, quality, health servicesa. The primary initial focus
of UHC policies has been on the extension of financial pro-
tection against health care costs through the provision of
insurance and the removal of user fees at the point of use.
Specific international attention to sexual and repro-
ductive health has placed such services at the forefront
of the UHC debate. A total of 179 nations committed to
protect reproductive and health rights of women and
girls at the International Conference on Population and
Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994, and this was
reaffirmed at subsequent conferences in Beijing and
Copenhagen. The High-Level Task Force for ICPD was
established in 2012 to take forward this agenda in the
period leading up to the twentieth anniversary of this
commitmentb. Inclusion of MDG goal 5b was owed to
the momentum of these conferences [2]. Consequently,
Reproductive Maternal and Newborn Health (RMNH)
services have often been the first priority of the UHC
policies of the different countries.
With respect to removal of fees, this has amounted to
a paradigm shift, with a growing consensus that user fees
are regressive and undermine equitable access to essential
health services [3], as do all types of out-of-pocket payment
[4]. In particular, a concern that pregnant women and
children under five years are negatively affected by
such financial barriers has prompted many low- and
middle-income countries to reconsider levying user
charges by ensuring either more thorough implementation
of exemption or waiver mechanisms, significant reduction
in fee levels, or their abolition altogether [5,6]. While its
impact on the level of out-of-pocket payments in the
health system may not be definitive (and indeed, most
health systems remain heavily dependent on out-of-pocket
payments), such a policy shift [5] will undoubtedly have
consequences for the health system across a number of
dimensions, including the search for replacement revenue
and ensuring quality in responding to the changes in
utilization, reflecting increased numbers and patterns of
utilization [3,7]. Both of these anticipated consequences
raise specific concerns for human resources for health
(HRH), yet this issue has been frequently overlooked until
recently. Campbell et al. [5] suggest that demand-sidesupport, ensuring that access is no longer constrained by
payment for services, requires balance with support for
the supply side in terms of capacity and quality of care.
This research responds to this concern.
The objective of this research was to determine the
associations and inter-relationships between workforce
characteristics (stock, distribution and competencies) and
equitable access to RMNH services resulting from the
removal of, or exemption from user fees.
The research questions that we sought to answer were
to understand the evidence of the impact of fees, exemp-
tions and fee removal on HRH, and of HRH characteristics
on the impact of fees, exemptions and fee removal. The
sub-questions, to be addressed specifically in Sierra Leone,
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Nepal and Ghana were: to describe the
RMNH workforce in terms of its stock, distribution, skill
mix, workload, remuneration and terms and conditions; to
project need for RMNH workforce and identify plans in
place to enhance quantitative and qualitative capacity; to
describe the situation with respect to formal fees and
exemptions, the revenue generated and its distribution,
and effects on demand for health care; and to identify the
policy implications.
Background
In the five case-study countries, there have been significant
developments in both financing and human resources for
health policy that have led to their selection as case studies
and provide the background to the study. In Ghana, Nepal,
Sierra Leone and Zambia, the health system was designed
during the mid-twentieth century or earlier to provide
universal coverage through a public health-care system that
is free at the point of use, financed largely through the
government budget and mainly, therefore, through
taxation and funds derived from development assistance.
In the post-independence period, problems emerged to
varying degrees, in sustaining accessible services at an
adequate level of quality through this mechanism, and
were generally attributed to funding shortfalls. User
charges started to be introduced as early as 1969 in Ghana
and as late as the early 1990s in Zambia. In Zimbabwe,
fees existed at independence, but the exemption system
effectively qualified most families for free health care until
the mid-1990s when similar pressures emerged and user
fees increased and became more widely applied.
In Ghana, exemptions were introduced for delivery
care in 2004, first in five regions, then across the country.
The policy was later superseded in 2008 by free coverage of
all pregnant women within the National Health Insurance
Scheme (NHIS). Both policies were undermined by
poor availability of funds. Government HRH policy
focused on task shifting and improving distribution,
including introducing the deprived area incentive
scheme, augmenting salaries in 55 districts. Large pay
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there was a significant expansion of training schools,
although there were also some concerns about the
effect of this expansion on quality of training.
In Nepal, in principle, all citizens have free access to
primary care. Targeted groups are also protected from
secondary care costs. However, both policies have been
undermined by shortfalls in funding. In 2005, financial
incentives were introduced to encourage women to
deliver in a facility, and in 2008 the Aama policy was
introduced, providing free institutional deliveries in all
public and some private facilities. The HRH strategy of
2003 aimed to increase the public sector workforce by
71% by 2017, with an emphasis on ensuring increased
numbers of health workers with skilled birth attendance
competencies.
In Sierra Leone, the Free Health Care Policy (FHCP)
was introduced in 2010, providing for free public care
for pregnant women, lactating women and children
under five years. Substantial salary increases were funded
in 2011 and a performance-based financing system at
district level was introduced in 2011. HRH policy
planned incentives for hard-to-reach areas and reformed
career paths and recruitment processes, although little
progress had been made in these areas at the time of
the research.
In Zambia, user fees were abolished for rural primary
care in 2006 and in peri-urban areas in 2007 in both
government and mission facilities. A Department for
International Development (DFID) grant was provided
to enable compensation for the resulting loss of revenue.
HRH policies emphasized the training and recruitment
of graduates, the development of a human resource
(HR) information system, and the scaling up of the
Zambia Health Workers Retention Scheme, offering salary
top-ups in remote areas.
In Zimbabwe, there was a policy of free care but it had
been inconsistently applied, and there was a perception
that charging could be locally determined. HRH expend-
iture collapsed to 0.3% of the public health budget in 2008.
Dollarization of the economy may have improved the
position of health workers since then, and also increased
the real value of those fees that are charged. An Emergency
Retention Scheme was introduced, supporting salaries of
key professional cadres, but this will be phased out by 2013.
The HRH strategic plan identified the key priority of staff
retention.
Methods
This study consisted of the following components:
literature review, desk-based analysis and document
review, field studies and analysis. No experimental
research or research on humans was involved in this
work.Literature review
We undertook a review of the current literature on the
removal of, exemption from or waivers of user fees in
low- and middle-income countries in relation to RMNH
and the consequences for human resources for health
working in RMNH. First, to be included, studies had
to address either the removal of user charges or the
application of exemptions and/or waivers in order to
facilitate access to RMNH services in low- and
middle-income countries. The user fee, exemption
and waiver mechanisms at national, provincial and
district level were explored. The second criterion for
inclusion was consideration of the effect of these financing
instruments on RMNH health personnel, particularly
cadres of skilled birth attendants (SBAs), including nurses,
midwives, doctors and clinical officers and the paramedical,
support and ancillary staff.
The final criterion was publication date, which was
restricted to 2001 to 2011, with some exceptions, where
studies on the introduction of user fees from the 1980s
to 1990s were included for historical context. Only
studies and reports written in the English language were
collected, collated and consolidated in the bibliography. The
following databases and sources were searched: PubMed,
Popline, SCOPUS, Science Direct, Web of Knowledge,
Human Resources for Health Journal, Equinet, MNCH
knowledge portal, ELDIS, HRH Global Resource Centre,
World Health Organization, Alliance for Health Policy
and Health Systems Research, and Google Scholar, using a
list of 66 keywords.
In the initial search, 500 articles were identified, out of
which 267 were shortlisted based on the keywords
above; the abstracts were then reviewed independently
by two researchers and 115 were shortlisted. Following
a further refinement of the search parameters, in which
the keywords were narrowed to exclude any articles not
including reference to human resources engaged with
RMNH activity, a final list of 67 was included and
the full articles were included and reviewed. Simi-
larly, the grey literature search furnished 200 docu-
ments and 35 were included following the aforesaid
procedure.
Desk-based data analysis and document review
We sought data on:
 Human resource numbers and distribution (by cadre
and district) in public and private sectors and before
and after the financing policy change of interest,
where relevant;
 Public and private sector remuneration and
allowances, and trends;
 RNMH need as measured by the population and
birth rate by district;
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levels of use of antenatal care, postnatal care,
deliveries, newborn care, abortions, and family
planning, gynaecological, sexually transmitted
diseases (STD) and HIV clinic services.
Access to data sets held by Ministries of Health,
Central Statistical Offices and similar offices was secured
along with policy and planning documents, through the
recruitment of local collaborators in a position to access
these. Grey literature was located by web search and by
contacting relevant local agencies. The search for data
and documents was undertaken during 2011.
Much of the data sought proved unavailable. Trend
data were generally unavailable either due to an absence
of maintenance of a historic database, or because pre-
vious estimates of variables were made in a way not
comparable with those of present estimates. Private
sector data were difficult to access and sparse where
available at all.
Field studies
Field studies were undertaken in two countries (Sierra
Leone and Zimbabwe) to gain more in-depth under-
standing in both HRH and financing domains. These
countries were selected because there was a smaller
literature base on user fees and their removal, in these
countries than in others. In Sierra Leone, the time was
spent accessing documents and secondary data and seeking
clarifications in relation to data that appeared inconsistent.
Data quality was poor, and there remain considerable
gaps in what we were able to collect.
Analysis
In each country we analysed available data and research
reports to review: (1) how financing policy change had
affected utilization levels; (2) the geographical distribu-
tion of the health workforce; (3) delivery workloads and
how actual workloads and potential workloads (based on
the total number of births that are estimated for the
country) compared to what is considered by the WHO
to be a feasible workload; and (4) remuneration and
terms and conditions. In the discussion section, we
address to what extent a review of these data help to
answer our research questions concerning the inter-
relationships between workforce and financing situations
and policies.
Qualitative data were transcribed and analysed themat-
ically, starting from the topics outlined in the interview
guides, but allowing for identification of new themes
arising from the discussions. Analysis of the distribution
of the health workforce in each country computed
concentration indices (CIs). These are constructed by
ordering districts by increasing population density(from most sparsely to most densely populated districts)
and measuring the distance between actual and equal
shares of health workers per head of population in each
district. A hypothetical situation where health workers are
distributed equally in proportion to population across the
country produces a CI of zero (no distance from actual to
equal share). In a situation where the distribution favours
densely populated areas, the index will be greater than
zero. Maximum, pro-urban, concentration is where the
whole of the staff is based in the most densely populated
district and the corresponding CI is one.
Literature review
In the mid-1980s, many low- and middle-income countries
were encouraged to introduce user fees as a response to
declining national health budgets. User fees were presented
as a means of cost recovery of public health expenditure,
as well as enhancing efficiency and equity [3,8]. The
Bamako Initiative, put into action by African Ministers of
Health, followed on closely in 1987. It included user fees
among its instruments, amid assertions that it would
produce quality improvements in services through the
local retention of generated revenue. It also placed a strong
emphasis on community participation [7,8].
However, after more than two decades of global
user-fee experience, these objectives have been rigorously
critiqued [9-11]. As the regressive nature of user fees has
come under close scrutiny [3,9,12] many countries have
taken steps to either reduce or abolish user fees in
their health facilities, or to more consistently apply
exemptions or waivers from fees for specific groups
or services [13-15].
The slow progress in reducing the high levels of
maternal and neonatal deaths in low income countries
has led to a renewed commitment to improve provision
and access to RMNH services [3]. At least three quarters
of neonatal deaths and a similar proportion of maternal
deaths occur outside hospital [16]. User fees are cited
as a considerable financial barrier to women’s care-seeking
during and following their pregnancy [17,18]. A long list
of countries including Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Nepal,
Niger, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda and Zambia
have pursued fee removal or exemption policies for
delivery care and/or caesarean section [6]. Most stud-
ies reviewing utilization following the abolition of
user charges for deliveries and other related maternity
care have observed a rise in assisted deliveries and
caesarean sections at health facilities [3,13,18-25] and,
in some cases, show that gains are concentrated in
poorer groups [8,14].
Campbell et al. [5], however, present another perspec-
tive in acknowledging the challenges now presented by
fee removal:
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health services if there is no qualified health worker
available to provide care, or where you may queue all
day only to be afforded an ineffectual consultation
which undermines respect, trust, privacy and
confidentiality? Such are the realities in many low-
income countries, particularly in rural and remote
areas, where health workers are drastically in short
supply, and often over-burdened and ⁄ or under-
resourced (p.1)
Lee et al. [17] concur, arguing that, ‘strategies to
increase demand for services need to be accompanied
by actions to ensure the supply side can cope with
the increased demandʼ (p.114).
Recent reviews of the growing trend to abolish or
suspend user fees highlight that for these policies to
be effective, careful planning of the supply-side re-
sponse to the stimulated demand has to take place
[8,9,13,23,24,26,27].
The literature generally underplays the important
contribution of fee revenue at facility level [27]. In
Senegal, for example, at the higher levels of the system,
user fees made up 37% of the revenue of the regional
hospital and 43% of the Centres de Santé, whereas the
health posts derived 95 to 96% of their revenues from
user fees [21]. In situations where fee revenue was
retained by the district or sub-district facility, it also
allowed some autonomy and flexibility for the district
health management team or the health centre in charge
to respond to gaps in funding [28]. Such discretionary
funding would often supplement low salaries, cover delays
in receiving salaries or cover the costs of community or
support staff [21,24,28-30]. Several studies, for example,
Kipp et al. [31], also describe the important role such
incentives had on staff motivation. Often, technical
and community support staff received wages or small
bonuses from user-fee revenues in Afghanistan [28],
Uganda [32] Zambia [29] and Senegal [21].
Increases in utilization lead to increases in staff
workloads if there is no additional recruitment. In
several countries this was anticipated with a concomitant
rise in salary; in other countries a lack of preparation and
planning compounded the problem of staff shortages and
difficulties with rural allocation and retention, leading to
significantly low morale.
Most studies reported that health staff considered their
workload to have increased since the new policies on fee
removal or exemptions commenced [13,19,24,28,33,34].
Witter et al. [21] report similar increases (of about one
third) in delivery workloads for midwives in Senegal and
medical assistants in Ghana [18,22]. Concomitant with in-
creased workload, various studies report declining morale -
in Burundi [33], South Africa [190], and Uganda [24] - madeworse where allowances or bonuses are also removed, as in
Zambia [29]. In both Zambia [29,35] and Uganda [36-38]
additional funding was released by the Ministries of
Health to the districts to compensate for loss of revenue.
In Uganda, according to Nabyonga-Orem et al. [36], flexi-
bility in how these funds were to be used was allowed,
although Ssengooba et al. [30] suggest that the additional
funds did not directly compensate staff. In Zambia, few
guidelines were provided by the Ministry of Health about
what the ‘user fee replacement grants’ could be used
for [29], decisions about their use were centralized
and distribution did not reflect the former levels of
user-fee collection [39].
Loss of financial autonomy provided by user fees has
been regretted in a number of countries, including
Burundi. Before the introduction in 2006 of free health
services for children under five years and free deliveries,
hospitals retained all user fees and were expected to be
relatively self sufficient [33]. Following the abolition of
fees for these services, delays in reimbursement affected
hospital and health-centre functioning, as they now
could not pay for their own supplies. In Burkina Faso,
the 20% bonus formerly received by RMNH staff for
deliveries from the user fee was retained but with no
guidance on how to calculate from which price they
should take the 20% [13,26].
In Nepal and Burkina Faso, reimbursement tariffs were
decided centrally by the Ministry of Health. Nepal’s
national free delivery policy has retained incentive
payments to health workers of the earlier scheme
[14]. The tariffs in Nepal varied according to facility
type and degree of obstetric complication [15]. In
Niger, the additional administrative and clinical workload
experienced by health workers, and created by increased
utilization, was acknowledged, and a payment of a monthly
bonus supplemented their salary [40].
Community and support staff often had to be made
redundant once facilities no longer had discretionary
funds from fee revenue. This occurred in Uganda [32].
Some of the staff of the Centres de Santé community in
Senegal received a fixed monthly allowance [21].
Very few studies identified the cadres affected by fee
removal or exemptions. Witter et al. [21] cite a shortage
of midwives in Senegal. The workforce associated with
delivery care in Nepal remained stable or increased,
but increases were not directly related to financing
policy [14] (p.89).
While Hoope-Bender et al. [41] argue that, ‘most
primary health care frontline workers are not suffi-
ciently skilled to deliver a minimum MNH service
packageʼ (p.230), others are more hopeful that a
process of careful planning for task shifting could
produce sufficient skills in lower cadres to meet the
need, including performing caesarean sections [42].
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How financing policy change affected utilization levels
In Ghana, the delivery exemption policy appeared to be
effective in raising utilization with some modest equity
gains [18]. One study has compared baseline data in two
districts, before the NHIS (in 2004) and after (in 2007)
[43]. Its findings suggest that there has been an increase
in access to formal care amongst members, as well as a
significant decrease in out-of-pocket expenditure.
However, there was no difference in use of maternal care
(antenatal care (ANC), deliveries or caesarean sections)
between the intervention and control group.
While there is no public information on trends in use
of outpatient services by insured patients specifically,
outpatient use for the population as a whole shows a
marked increase from 2005 onward, compared to stable
(low) use before. The timing and pattern correlated with
growth in NHIS membership, indicating that the NHIS
has indeed increased service use [44]. According to an
International Labour Organization (ILO) paper of 2006,
‘utilization for the insured was then at around 0.9
(OPD [out patients] per capita - almost twice the
non-insured (then at 0.49 visits per capita)’ [44].
However, even the rate for the insured falls far below
the Service Availability and Readiness Assessment
(SARA)c benchmark level of 5 [45]. It is also interesting to
note that overall admissions have not experienced
consistent growth between 2005 and 2008. This might
reflect the benefits of early intervention through better
access to outpatient care.
In Nepal, the latest household survey on the Aama
programme [46] indicates that over the past five years,
there has been a substantial increase in the proportion
of women giving birth in a health facility (albeit from
very low levels). In high Human Development Index
(HDI) districts, the rate of institutional delivery care has
increased from 33 to 54% and in low HDI districts from
6 to 21% between 2005 and 2010.
There was some evidence of pro-poor impact of fee
exemption: three low-HDI districts saw higher rates of
free-facility births than three high-HDI districts, and in
the low-HDI districts, poorer women were more likely
to receive free care. Trends over time by wealth
group show that inequality in facility births has fallen
substantially and marginalized castes have seen large
increases in utilization over the past five years.
In Sierra Leone, the impact of the FHCP on utilization
appears mixed [47]. For outpatient visits of children
under five years, there was a more than twofold increase
in the number of consultations in the twelve months
post-FHCP introduction compared to the last year
before the FHCP. However, this conceals a gradual
downward trend in the later part of the first year
post-FHCP, and even after the increase there werefewer than 0.5 consultations per member of the popula-
tion per year. Liaqat and Ferry [48] confirm that there was
a sharp and statistically significant increase in health
utilization by children under five years across Bombali
District immediately after the introduction of the FHCP,
but the peak was not sustained. In the immunization of
children under age one, 88% of children were fully
immunized pre-FHCP but this had fallen to 76%
post-FHCP [47].
In maternal health, there was an increase of 45% in
the number of pregnant women making at least one
ANC visit. There was an initial increase in the number
of postnatal care (PNC) consultations, but a slight
reduction towards the end of the first year. The number
of new acceptors of modern family-planning methods
increased by about 140% in the first 12 months of the
FHCP [49]. Again, these percentage increases must be
understood in the context of very low initial levels of
service use.
In Zambia, after free care was introduced in 2006, an
analysis of facility records from the Health Management
Information System (HMIS) showed that removing user
fees for primary health care services increased the
number of outpatient visits in rural districts by patients
over five years of age, and achieved visit-per-capita rates
of two in rural districts, well above the African and urban
Zambian average, if still far below SARAd benchmarks
[35,50]. However, there was a wide difference across
districts, ranging from a fall of 39% to an increase of more
than 100% [51]. The increase in utilization was not always
sustained over time and there was indication of crowding-
out of children under five years, who already received care
free of charge before the policy change. Analysis of a
comprehensive national facility-based dataset found that
utilization increased by 55% among the rural population
aged at least five years. Utilization increases were greatest
in the districts with the highest levels of poverty and
material deprivation [35], although this analysis regressed
percentage utilization change with district deprivation
score, and may have been confounded by an underlying
correlation of initial utilization levels and deprivation.
However, analysis of the Living Conditions Measurement
Surveys (LCMS) did not confirm an increase in access to
care. The analysis found no evidence that removing fees
improved the probability to seek care when falling ill, even
after adjusting for the varying degree of implementation
of the policy across districts [51].
In Zimbabwe, there is a lack of clarity about the
levels of fees that should apply, and have, in practice,
applied over recent decades. This implies that ana-
lyses of utilization trends cannot be linked effectively
to discrete changes in policy and implementation.
However, there is evidence that fees act as a deterrent
to use of health care [49].
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was viewed as difficult to afford for most families, even in
the absence of complications. This is likely to be one
factor behind the high rate of home deliveries, even
though these are discouraged (and as a result, traditional
birth attendants (TBAs) were nervous about speaking
about their work), and despite the fact that families have
to bring newborn babies into health facilities to get a birth
record [52].
The geographical distribution of the health workforce
WHO defines an SBA as,
… an accredited health professional – such as a
midwife, doctor or nurse – who has been educated
and trained to proficiency in the skills needed to
manage normal (uncomplicated) pregnancies,
childbirth and the immediate postnatal period, and in
the identification, management and referral of
complications in women and newbornse.
While this definition is clear in principle, it is not
always easy to operationalize in any given context. Some
categories of staff in use include those who have and
have not been educated in this set of competencies. For
example, some nurses may have undertaken specialist
childbirth-related training and some not. Furthermore,
those whose training has included these competencies
may not have undertaken relevant practice in the mean-
time, or may not have retained them for other reasons.
The categories of staff, at least some of whom have
SBA capacities in the five countries, can be listed as
doctors, nurses, midwives (not a separate category
from nurses in Nepal and Zimbabwe), clinical officers
(Zambia and Zimbabwe only), and auxiliary nurse midwives
(Nepal only).
We were able to disaggregate data for public and
private sectors in Ghana, Nepal and Sierra Leone, and
further separate non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and faith-based organizations (FBOs) from the rest of the
private sector in Sierra Leone. These data show that in
Ghana, most health professionals work in the public
sector, namely, 80% of doctors, 80% of midwives and
91% of nurses. In Nepal the situation is almost
reversed: 83% of doctors, 59% of nurses and 33% of
auxiliary nurse midwives work in the private sector.
In Sierra Leone, 58% of doctors, 62% of nurses and
66% of midwives work in the public sector while 15%
of doctors, 16% of nurses and 16% of midwives work
in FBOs. The remainder work in the for-profit sector.
In Zambia it is reported elsewhere that 80% of health
workers worked in the public sector in 2006 [53] and
in Zimbabwe, it has been estimated that 45% of doctors
work full-time in the private sector [54].In Zambia, data were available for two time periods,
2004 and 2010. It was not possible to obtain data for
more than one time period in any other country. Figure 1
shows the comparative CIs for the five countries, computed
in this manner.
The figure shows that in all countries but Sierra
Leone, doctors are much more concentrated in
densely populated (urban) areas than other cadres. In
Sierra Leone, nurses and midwives are about equally
concentrated in those areas, and no cadre provides
cover for remoter rural areas. Overall, the concentration
of doctors in urban areas is most pronounced in Nepal.
Clinical officers in Zambia and Auxiliary Nurse Midwives
(ANMs) in Nepal are spread almost equally across areas,
in line with population numbers, suggesting the significant
potential for such additional, non-traditional cadres
to contribute to more equitable population coverage
for RMNH services. However, in Zimbabwe it is
nurse/midwives who make the most contribution to
providing RMNH services in remoter rural areas. The
number of clinical officers is very small and most of them
are in Harare. Figure 2 compares public and private sector
CIs for those countries for which that disaggregation
was possible.
The figure shows that, according to those HRH data
available, Nepal achieves fairly equitable distribution of
health workers in its public sector: its high overall CIs
(Figure 2) reflect the dominance of the private sector in
the employment of health workers. In Ghana and Nepal,
the private sector employs health workers predominantly
in urban areas resulting in CIs considerably higher than
for the public sector. The further disaggregation in
Sierra Leone between NGO/FBO and other private sectors
shows the importance of this distinction. In Sierra Leone,
health workers in the NGO/FBO sector are most equitably
distributed. Nevertheless, they are still highly concentrated
in urban areas - more so than staff in the public sectors of
Ghana and Nepal.
Delivery workloads
Table 1 shows the workload in terms of the current
numbers of deliveries per SBA and per doctor, and the
number of births per SBA and per doctor in each country
as a whole. This shows the actual workload, if evenly
distributed among all health workers in the country and
the full coverage workload, if all deliveries were attended
by an SBA in a facility. In Zambia, the definition of an
SBA is particularly difficult and we show these totals for
both a ‘narrow’ and a ‘broad’ definitione.
The WHO suggests that one doctor is required for
around 1000 birthsf, to provide emergency intervention
where there are complications before, during and after
delivery, whereas a midwife can provide care for 175
births per year. On the basis of these assumptions, most
Figure 1 Concentration indices: health workers by cadre, latest available dates.
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workers relative to current levels of facility-based delivery,
with the exception of Sierra Leone. This is not surprising,
as the availability of health staff and the quality-of-care
problems that can result from excess demand for their
services, serve to constrain demand. In Sierra Leone,
births with ANMs, Community Health Officers (CHOs)
and nurses, as well as midwives and doctors, are counted
as attended births although ANMs, CHOs and nurses do
not meet the training requirements to be classified as
SBAs [55]. Ghana and Zimbabwe even have sufficient staff
to provide full coverage for facility-based SBAs. Other
countries have some shortfalls in relation to ability to
provide full coverage. Clearly, this includes Sierra Leone,
which does not have sufficient staff to cope even with the
current workload. Zambia does not have a sufficient
number of doctors, nor marginally, skilled birth attendants,
under the narrow definition. Nepal has sufficient doctors
for full coverage but not SBAs.
However, the dominant problem restricting access to
skilled birth attendance in a facility is distribution: bothFigure 2 Concentration indices in public and private sectors.geographic distribution and distribution among the
public and private sectors. In Ghana, all regions have
sufficient SBAs and doctors to provide full coverage,
although this may not be true at district level. The
situation is similar in Zimbabwe for SBAs, although
regional numbers suggest that most districts are likely
to have sufficient SBAs to cope, even with full coverage.
This is not the case for Zimbabwe, where doctors are
insufficient to cover actual current workload in four out of
ten regions, or to provide full coverage in seven out of ten
regions. This compares to no more than 120 births and
100 deliveries per doctor in Harare and Bulawayo [51]. In
Nepal, only two of five regions (the Central and Western
Development Regions) have sufficient doctors for either
current workload or full coverage, and whereas all regions
have sufficient ANMs for the current workload, none have
sufficient for full coverage. At the extreme, the Far
Western Development Region has one doctor for
every 7562 births and one ANM for every 517 births.
Nearly all districts in Sierra Leone have insufficient
staff to cope with current workload. At the extreme,
Table 1 Delivery workload for skilled birth attendants and doctors: actual rate of facility-based deliveries and full
coverage (all births)
Births per SBA Births per doctor Attended deliveries per SBA Attended deliveries per doctor
Ghana 2010/11 29 283 13 127
Nepal 2011 309 525 132 224
Sierra Leone 1202 1048 320 279
Zambia, narrow 185 1317 73 515
Zambia, broad 133 52
Zimbabwe 18 475 12 313
SBA skilled birth attendant.
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births and one midwife for every 4627 current facility
deliveries, explaining the use of under-skilled staff to
play this role. In Zambia, 55 districts (76%) have
insufficient doctors to provide coverage at a rate of one
for every 1000 births; 13 (18%) have no doctors at all. In
36 districts (50%) there is insufficient staff for full coverage
under the narrow definition of SBA and 8 districts (11%)
have insufficient staff for actual levels of facility-based
delivery under the broad definition.
We were able to break down staff and workload
numbers by district and public and private sectors in
Sierra Leone. Of our five case studies, Sierra Leone
has some of the most extreme RMNH staff shortages
according to the above analysis. The numbers cited above
for Kailahun are unaffected by the public-private disaggre-
gation, as there is no private sector of either type there.
This is likely to apply in other contexts: those districts that
are most under-served in general are those in which
private sector presence is likely to be least. A better served
district such as Western Area has a relatively manageable
119 actual deliveries per midwife. Excluding sources of
private-sector care that number rises to 175, on the cusp
of what is considered manageable and indicating that
even Western region would require more public sector
midwives to provide adequately skilled care to an increasing
rate of utilization of SBAs in public facilities.
Remuneration and terms and conditions
It is very difficult to compare terms and conditions.
There are variations in entry-level qualifications required,
length of training and other barriers to entry to the health
professions, and some of the case studies show these to be
in flux as attempts are made to cope with shortages by
reducing such barriers. Conditions that are important to
health workers cannot all be captured as a national-level
phenomenon: the quality and security of accommodation
available; the working conditions, including presence of
utilities and availability of basic supplies to support
effective work; and the sanitary and other infection
prevention conditions cannot be effectively compared
and summarized across countries.We have attempted to compare public sector salaries
for the main health professions involved in RMNH. This
is complex for several reasons. First, health professions
are defined slightly differently. For example, we have used
the term, doctor, but attempted to capture the ranges of
pay and allowances that apply to a health professional with
a medical degree, operating as a general primary provider,
excluding specialists operating at tertiary level from our
calculations. However, pay scales often overlap between
longer-serving general doctors and more junior specialists
and an approximate cut-off was used in some cases.
Enrolled and registered nurses are still separated categories
in some countries (among our case studies, Sierra Leone).
As previously discussed, midwives are not a separate
category in all countries.
Second, comparisons of different currencies can be
made in terms of purchasing-power parity. However
estimates of the rate of translation of a currency to its
international dollar value are not made continuously.
Currently, the best available estimates are from 2009.
For Zimbabwe, these relate to the pre-dollarized econ-
omy and cannot be used for our purposes. Zimbabwean
estimates are consequently presented in US dollars.
Third, we are interested in the relative, as well as the
absolute value of salaries. We have compared salary
levels to measures of national income or national prod-
uct per capita as a measure of this. However, income
distributions may differ and good-quality data on in-
come distribution in Africa are scarce. If health workers
benchmark their standards of living against others
within their society they deem professionally compar-
able, our analysis is unable to indicate what this com-
parison may indicate.
Table 2 shows the public-sector pay (salary midpoints)
of health workers in international dollarsg and as a ratio
to gross national income (GNI) per capita for the
countryh. In Zimbabwe the figures are for US dollars
and gross domestic product (GDP) at current exchange
ratesi.
The data suggest that complaints about poor pay for
most cadres in most countries would be unjustified, and
in all cases health workers earn well above average rates
Table 2 Public sector remuneration (salary midpoints incorporating allowances) in international dollars and as a ratio
to GNI per capita (all current: December 2011)
Value of salary and allowances in international dollars Salary expressed as ratio to per capita gross national income
Doctora Nurse Midwife Doctor Nurse Midwife
Ghana 3932 2171 2171 28.4 15.7 15.7
Nepal 4408 3851 43.7 38.2
Sierra Leone 3179 429c 578d 46.0 6.2c 8.4d
Zambia 5346 2167 46.5 18.4
Zimbabweb 218 176 4.4 3.6
aGeneral medical doctor or closest equivalent available; bZimbabwe estimates are expressed in US dollars and as a ratio to per capita gross domestic product at
current exchange rates; cstate-enrolled nurse; dstate-registered nurse and community midwife.
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but Zimbabwe appear to be among a rich elite earning
28- to 46-fold the average income. Nurses in Ghana,
Nepal and Zambia are nearly as well paid, in the range
of 15- to 38-fold. The recent pay award in Sierra Leone
puts Sierra Leonean doctors into the same category, but
leaves Sierra Leonean enrolled and registered nurses and
midwives much less well paid. Zimbabwean health workers
are more modestly paid than their counterparts in the
other four countries. In those countries in which high
salaries apply, reform of salary scales has been among the
recent HRH policy innovations, suggesting a trend that
other countries, and at least Zimbabwe among our case
study countries, may have little choice but to follow.
As suggested above, the comparison with per capita
GNP or GDP does not enable assessment of the relative
remuneration in the sectors that health workers may deem
comparable. It is difficult to obtain data for the top end of
income distributions in African countries. Survey data are
subject to large errors because of the small population
earning at high levels and probable biases in the self-
reporting of income among this population. The Zambia
Living Conditions Monitoring Survey of 2004, for example,
uses a cut-off of ZK 800 000 (approximately US$ 150 at
current exchange rates) per month as its upper income
threshold. Eighteen percent of Zambians stated an income
of this level or above in 2004 and no further breakdowns
of this figure are available. Doctors’ incomes have been
estimated at more than 10-fold this cut-off, and nurses’
incomes at 3- to 4-fold.
Another possibility is that comparisons are not made
locally but with international salary benchmarks. Given
the increasing international mobility of health workers,
it may be considered by governments setting salaries
that health workers can only be retained if international
salary levels can be matched. However, salaries so out of
touch with the national economic capacity raise significant
questions of sustainability, not only in a long-term future
in which aid dependency is reduced, but also in an
aid-supported future in which health worker numbers
are significantly higher.Discussion
This study relied on secondary data and is constrained
by the limited extent of those data. In particular, there
were very few historic data that we were able to access,
and we were generally unable to compare the situation
of the health workforce before and after financing-policy
change. Secondary data are also affected by well-known
quality concerns that in the cases of individual datasets are
difficult to assess. We benefited, however, from recent
initiatives to strengthen HRH databases in several of the
countries. Despite constraints in the data collection process,
we believe the data we have used were the most up-to-date
at the time of collection (2011) and those believed the best
quality available in each country.
Of the four case-study countries that have removed
or introduced exemptions for user fees for RMNH
(in the fifth case-study country, Zimbabwe, no discrete
policy change was introduced), only in Nepal is there clear
evidence of positive impact on utilization without signifi-
cant exception. In Ghana, better evidence is available in re-
lation to the earlier maternal health exemption programme
than the more recent inclusion of free maternal health
services in the NHIS, although an evaluation of the
NHIS exemption for pregnant women was due in
2012, according to Ministry of Health sources. It appears
clear that utilization increased where free care was effect-
ively available, but implementation difficulties, most notably
under-funding of the programme, implied that effective free
care (at least as judged by users) was not sustained,
with the implication that higher rates of utilization
also could not be sustained. In Zambia, fee removal
was not specifically targeted at Maternal and Newborn
Child Health (MNCH) services and there is conflicting
evidence of the impact of fee removal on utilization.
In Sierra Leone, data suggest an initial increase in
outpatient visits for children under five years in the
first year of the policy, but a gradual decline since
then, and an overall fall in immunization levels, which
may have been caused by factors external to the policy.
These findings illustrate the importance of attending to
the supply side, including human resource constraints,
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through financing policy change.
In Nepal and Zambia, there is some evidence that user-
fee removal has particularly enhanced the utilization of
poorer groups (Nepal) or areas (Zambia), although we have
expressed some doubt about the Zambian analysis on this
point. In other countries, it has not been possible to break
down utilization change in this way.
The HRH situation in case-study countries is more
variable than might have been expected. At national
level, shortages of HR relative to the needs of RMNH
services are not universal. However, in general, there are
local shortages relative to need, either because of overall
national level shortages, which are acute in Sierra Leone
and more marginal in Zimbabwe, or because maldistri-
bution creates local shortage where there is national
sufficiency. The relative contribution of health workers
in the private sector is difficult to measure. Although
such workers represent capacity to deal with RMNH
needs, they may be under-used to the extent that people
are unable to access those health workers due to the
financial barrier. In Nepal where the proportion of health
staff in the private sector is highest, this issue is more
important than it yet is in the African countries.
However, economic and private sector growth in
these countries implies that questions of access to
private-sector health staff and their influence on the
overall balance of need and HRH capacity will require
a more sophisticated analysis.
Low salaries are not the general situation of health
workers in the case-study countries, with salary levels
for doctors in Nepal, Sierra Leone and Zambia, implying
that they must be located at least in the top 2% of
the income distribution, and in Ghana, the top 3 to
4%j. Other cadres, other than nurses in Nepal, are
not quite so well paid. The situation in Sierra Leone
for non-doctor health workers and for all health
workers in Zimbabwe is more moderate, with pay
levels at 3- to 9-fold per capita GNI/GDP.
The relatively high salary levels for at least some
health workers suggest that their market position or
collective bargaining power is strong. One explanation
of this is the greatly increased level of international
migration since the 1990s. This implies a global market
for scarce medical skills in which some countries seem
positioned to compete, although the sustainability of that
level of competition is questionable both in the medium
and long terms. Benchmarks are not available and
the expectations of well-educated Africans and Asians,
whose economies are characterized by high degrees of
inequity in income distribution, are likely to be relatively
high in comparison to national incomes per capita than in
countries where education is less scarce. Given that only
2% of Zambians (for example, Zambia Living ConditionsMonitoring Survey, 2004) are educated to degree level
or above, it may be a reasonable expectation of those
who are, that their incomes should locate them in the
same elite.
Another key issue is the extent to which competence
in skilled birth attendance is difficult to assess across the
case-study countries. The research has relied on rules of
thumb about who counts or does not count as an SBA.
There are particular difficulties in this assessment in
Zambia, where no separate category of midwife exists
and where nurses are not all trained to an adequate level
of competence in skilled birth attendance; and in Sierra
Leone where Maternal Child Health (MCH) aides do
not meet the international definition of SBA but are
locally expected to play this role. Even health workers
who have initially been provided with sufficient training
but who are not highly motivated, have not subsequently
practised in the role of SBA, or have not received
sufficient in-service training since, will not in practice
have the requisite level of skill. Hence, the capacity to
scale up to 95% coverage of RMNH services is probably
more limited than it appears.
This research highlights gaps in systematic and well
planned coordination between financing policy and HR
policy. In our case-study countries, there have been
laudable attempts to plan for the impact of fee removal
or reduction, and sometimes concomitant supportive
change, even if not specifically responding to the needs
of financing-policy change. The global literature review
suggests that poor coordination is widespread. In some
cases, such as in Niger and Zambia, measures were
taken after problems associated with the removal of fees
became evident. In the case of Zambia, of which we
know more, the measures of compensation appeared to
come too little and too late, sometimes not at all.
A number of countries that removed fees also increased
health worker pay to some extent at around the same
time, although it is not clear that this was directly in
compensation of changes brought about by fees in all
cases. In Sierra Leone, the two policy debates have been
clearly linked and salaries were increased in preparation
for the FHCP [56]. Such explicit linkage is not apparent in
the other countries. In Zambia it is claimed that the
user-fee removal policy came with no plan or budget
to recruit and deploy health workers [57].
Rather like pay, in some cases additional recruitment
was undertaken concurrent to fee reform, but it is
not clear in Zambia or Ghana that this was carefully
planned as part of a package of complementary
policies. In contrast, Sierra Leone did plan increased
recruitment as an element of the FHCP and this had
been ‘partially achieved’ at the time of a review in
June 2010 in the sense that it was seen as contingent
on the salary uplift.
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and user-fee reform are among a plethora of interven-
tions that are being introduced concurrently but with
insufficient coordination. The literature on user fees is
now quite clear on the need for associated measures,
and the implications of the neglect of these are clear. In
the first place, failure to coordinate undermines the
impact of user-fee reform through what appear as imple-
mentation problems and result in the failure of policies
to secure expected results or to sustain them. In the
second place, user-fee reform may be exacerbating HR
problems. The clearest case of this is the Zambian one.
Ironically, the focus of user-fee removal on rural
districts, intended to target access improvements in rural
areas, has had a disproportionate effect on workloads in
rural areas, which were already significantly greater than
in urban areas. Worsening the relative conditions in
rural areas is likely, other things being equal, to worsen
the maldistribution of HRH and may result in rural
access deteriorating. In Sierra Leone, loss of user-fee
income has resulted in the loss of volunteer workers,
who in practice depended on user fees for an income
rather than constituting volunteers in the strict sense.
This may explain the declining rate of immunization, as
this appears to depend to some extent on such workers.
The difficulties of policy coordination are well-known
and are not confined to low- and middle-income settings
[56]. The specific set of policy process issues involved in
user-fee removal have been analysed by Meessen et al.
[58], who find that what they describe as ‘good practice’
has more often than not been absent in the six African
countries they review. One common feature they identify
is a ‘top-down’ and in many cases sudden and surprise
move to remove charges that planners and policy
makers at lower levels then struggle to adjust to. This
may partly explain some of the problems in our case-study
countries too.
The HRH situation also affects user-fee reform in
the sense that there is some evidence among our case
studies that staff who feel aggrieved because of a
sense of overwork, underpay or deterioration in conditions,
are more likely to undermine user-fee reform in the
interests of maintaining the status quo. In all countries,
there was evidence that services intended to be free were
not always experienced as such by users, although to
different extents. This problem was seen to be small
in Sierra Leone, and to have reduced in Nepal, but
indicates a clear link between the two areas of policy
in this direction. At the extreme, informal fees can
simply replace formal ones.
Linkage also operates in both directions through the
medium of quality of care. User-fee removal can only be
counted as successful to the extent that users recognize
a better option in the reformed service, comparing bothquality and price variables. Consideration of utilization
as an indicator of the effectiveness of policy reform
measures the direct and desired outcome, improved
access, but also indicates the extent of users’ preferences
for the reformed service [59]. The observation that initial
increases in utilization are not sustained (of our case
studies, most likely in Zambia) implies that neither
measure of success is long lived. Health workers
make perhaps the most critical contribution to quality
of care and to whether any utilization gains following
fee removal are sustained. Interpersonal aspects of
quality of care - whether users are treated with dig-
nity and respect and given the attention their problem
requires - always rank highly in studies of the attributes of
quality that matter to users, and are mainly under the
control of health workers. Health workers also have influ-
ence on whether drugs and other supplies are available
when required: they can conceal available stocks, and can
use initiative to replace drugs that are out of stock at the
time, for example. Aggrieved health workers who do not
support user-fee removal because they have not been
adequately compensated for the lost income and increased
workload, are least likely to support the maintenance of
quality in any of its dimensions.
Among the associated measures well-recognized in the
existing literature is the need to ensure replacement of
user-fee income where it is important at the local level.
User-fee income has typically been used to provide
bonuses to staff, employ additional contract staff and to
support drug supply. All the case studies of user-fee
removal or exemption except Nepal identified problems
in either the failure to replace user-fee income or the
inadequacy of the replacement in form or amount.
Conclusions
The interconnectedness between user-fee policy and
HRH situations has proved too difficult to assess with
the existing evidence base. Many policies have been
changing over the relevant period, some have changed
explicitly in response to problems associated with
financing policy change, others might have responded,
but policy documents do not make this clear in their
explanation of the policy rationale. Other relevant
variables have also changed and we do not have evi-
dence that would allow a full understanding of the
state of a country’s health system in the absence of
user-fee policy changes.
As is now well-recognized in the user-fee literature,
coordination of health financing and HR policies is
essential. This appears less well-recognized in the HR
literature. In order to support (whole or partial) free
health-care policies, investment needs to be made in pay
and recruitment, and in particular to ensure that relative
conditions of employment do not worsen for rural areas.
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imbalance of workloads in urban and rural areas may
not be sufficient. Policy coordination proves an intract-
able problem in many settings, not only in low- and
middle-income countries, but this does not mean that
improvement is not possible within health policies, and
across government and international stakeholders.
Replacement of user-fee income is only part of the
solution to the management of the introduction of free
health care. Human resources need specific attention in
relation to recruitment and retention, and most of all,
distribution. Policies focusing on incentives to attract
health staff to under-served areas are weak across all
case studies.
Demand-side financing approaches better replicate the
positive aspects of the incentives embedded in user-fee
systems, and appear to work well in Nepal. However,
they may not work everywhere. They clearly can only
work where reliable funding is maintained, as did not
happen in Ghana. They may also require particular
capacities of administrative systems, not always present,
and it is noteworthy that the Nepal programme has been
intensively supported with externally funded technical
input, its management has not been integrated with
general health system management and the challenge to
achieve greater integration is now recognized. A careful
analysis of the incentives embedded in alternative
mechanisms of user-fee replacement is required every-
where for the most effective system in its context to be
designed.
Policies need effective monitoring systems that focus
on the realities of their implementation as well as
their impacts. At present, the data required to monitor
effectively are insufficient, despite some recent efforts to
invest in this area.
Endnotes
a[http://www.who.int/universal_health_coverage/en/];
b[http://www.icpdtaskforce.org/about/mission-vision.
html];
cService Availability and Readiness Assessment: see
[REFD];
d[http://www.who.int/healthinfo/statistics/indbirthswith
skilledhealthpersonnel/en/] (accessed 15 March 2013);
ethe narrow definition includes only midwives, doctors
and clinical officers. The broad definition includes
midwives, doctors, clinical offers and nurses weighted
for the percentage of obstetric workload in the total
facility workload;
fThe World Health Report, 2005 (p91) suggests that
for a district with a birth rate of 30/1000, one full-
time-equivalent doctor is required for 3600 births.
Gabrysch et al. (2011) translates this into 1200 births
per doctor on the basis of three doctors required toprovide 24-hour cover. The WHO Making Pregnancy
Safer model specifies 1000 births per doctor, and we
apply this lower number, which also seems to allow
for professional development days, leave and sick leave;
gPWT 7.0 Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina
Aten, Penn World Table Version 7.0, Center for Inter-
national Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at
the University of Pennsylvania, May 2011. [http://pwt.econ.
upenn.edu/php_site/pwt70/pwt70_form.php] (accessed 15
December 2011);
h[http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.
PP.CD] (accessed 21 December 2011);
i[http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.
CD] (accessed 15 December 2011);
jdetailed income distribution data are not available but
these estimates are based on the extreme assumption
that those earning the given ratio of salaries to average
GDP/GNI per capita capture virtually the whole
GNI/GDP. More realistic assumptions rank the salary
earner more highly still, relative to the rest of the
population.
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